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I. INTRODUCTION 
A long-standing pillar of federal court litigation is the final judgment 
rule, currently codified in § 1291 of the Judicial Code.1 It provides for one 
appeal as of right from rulings of district courts, but states that only “final 
orders” at the trial level may be appealed.2 This means that interlocutory, 
* Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. This article was
prepared for a symposium on Federal Appellate Procedure at the University of Akron Law School in 
April 2020. Thanks to Bryan Lammon, Bob Martineau, David Skidmore, and Joan Steinman for 
helpful comments on an earlier draft; to Joe Cecil for guidance on accessing data on litigation 
involving 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) in federal court; and to Alisher Kassym for research assistance. 
© Copyright 2020 by Michael E. Solimine. 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018). 
2. Like most courts and commentators, I use “final order” and “final judgment” 
interchangeably. Interpreting § 1291, the Supreme Court has stated that a “final order” is a decision 
1
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non-final decisions cannot be immediately appealed. Those decisions can 
be appealed by the losing party as part of an appeal from a final judgment. 
The reasons for the rule are well-settled. Permitting unhappy litigants 
to immediately appeal any and all interlocutory decisions would cause 
havoc with the orderly administration of trial litigation and potentially 
flood appellate courts with cases. Such a regime would show little 
deference to decisions of trial courts and could lead to wasteful litigation 
and decisions at the appellate level, since interlocutory decisions may be 
mooted out in favor of the unhappy party (i.e., that party may win, or lose, 
the case anyway on other grounds). Similarly settled is the necessity for 
some exceptions to the final judgment rule. Consider that an interlocutory 
decision may be mooted by subsequent events (e.g., the denial of a motion 
for an injunction), cause unnecessary litigation until reversed on appeal 
(e.g., the erroneous denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction), 
or improperly prevent a case from being litigated at all (e.g., the erroneous 
denial of class action certification that is the “death knell” of the 
litigation). 
To ameliorate the harshness of the final judgment rule, Congress and 
the courts have developed exceptions, a full accounting of which is 
beyond the scope of this Article.3 Instead, I will focus on two of the 
exceptions: permissive interlocutory appeals, codified in § 1292(b) of the 
Judicial Code;4 and the collateral order doctrine. As discussed in Part II 
of this Article, § 1292(b) permits immediate appeals in civil cases under 
certain criteria, and as I have argued before, for a number of reasons is a 
relatively well-crafted exception, not least of which in that it requires the 
permission of both the district court and the appellate court.5 In my view 
this is no less true today, 30 years later. Moreover, § 1292(b) could and 
should have been used in at least two recent, high-profile cases to 
immediately review controversial interlocutory district court decisions. 
which “terminate[s the] action,” or “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court 
to do but execute the judgment.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 582, 586 
(2020) (quoting Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 409 (2015)). 
3. Other exceptions include immediate appeals of the grant or denials of motions for an
injunction (28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2018)); of orders only affecting one issue out of many, or one party 
in a multiple party case (FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b)); of class certification decisions (FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f)); 
and writs of mandamus. For useful summaries and discussion of these and other exceptions, see Bryan 
Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423 
(2013); Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, 
Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 729–48 (1993). 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018). 
5. Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1175–83 (1990) (advocating greater use of interlocutory appeals in some 
contexts, particularly those involving § 1292(b)). 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/4
2019] PERMISSIVE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS 609 
Part III of the Article addresses the collateral order doctrine. This 
exception has been controversial almost from its inception, both for its 
dubious provenance (ostensibly an interpretation of the final judgment 
statute) and, more importantly, the difficulties in applying the doctrine in 
a principled and coherent fashion. Those issues have been extensively 
addressed before,6 but what is worthy of further attention is the linkage of 
the doctrine to § 1292(b) appeals. The institutional standing of the 
doctrine is on uncertain grounds given the very existence of § 1292(b), 
enacted in 1958, and statues passed in 1990 and 1992 which permit 
rulemaking by the courts to create exceptions to the final judgment rule. 
True, the Supreme Court has ameliorated the problems of the doctrine by 
(mostly) narrowly construing it, but at the same time the Court has 
frequently pointed to § 1292(b) appeals as a more appropriate exception. 
Courts should take that advice seriously by applying § 1292(b), when 
appropriate, more often and, likewise, continue to narrowly interpret the 
collateral order doctrine or, better yet, do away with it entirely. 
II. APPLYING (AND REVIVING) PERMISSIVE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
This Part of the Article discusses the passage of, and controversies
associated with the application of interlocutory appeals under, 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); the application of this provision in recent, 
controversial appellate litigation; and how courts should apply § 1292(b) 
going forward. 
A. Background and Application of § 1292(b) 
Some version of the final judgment rule has statutorily existed since 
the beginning of the federal court system.7 The Supreme Court has 
frequently extolled the virtues of the rule. In one recent formulation, it 
said that while a “party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until 
final judgment has been entered, . . . [p]ermitting piecemeal, prejudgment 
appeals . . . undermines ‘efficient judicial administration’ and encroaches 
upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a ‘special role’ in 
managing ongoing litigation.”8 The “justification for immediate appeal,” 
the Court continued, “must therefore be sufficiently strong to overcome 
the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation conclude[d].”9 
6. See infra Part III(B).
7. Martineau, supra note 3, at 726–29. 
8. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (internal citation omitted). 
9. Id. at 107. 
3
Solimine: Permissive Interlocutory Appeals
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
610 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:607 
Consequently, it is not surprising that since the birth of the final 
judgment rule, Congress and federal courts have established mechanisms 
for exceptions to the rule. One of those exceptions is the Interlocutory 
Appeals Act, passed in 195810 and codified in § 1292(b) of the Judicial 
Code.11 As contemporaneously observed by Charles Alan Wright, the 
provision “represents a middle view between those who opposed any 
broadening of interlocutory review and those who favored giving the 
appellate courts discretion to entertain any interlocutory appeal they 
wished regardless of certification by the trial judge.”12 
The middle ground is expressed in several ways, most notably with 
the requirement of dual certification of an immediate appeal by both the 
district judge and the court of appeals. And not simply any issue can be 
certified; both levels of courts must find that several criteria must be 
satisfied: there must be a “controlling issue of law,” upon which there is 
a “substantial ground for difference of opinion,” such that an immediate 
appeal “may materially advance the termination of the litigation.”13 The 
drafters intended to open a narrow exception to the final judgment rule, to 
be used in only “exceptional cases where a decision of the appeal may 
avoid protracted and expensive litigation . . . where a question which 
would be dispositive of the litigation is raised and there is serious doubt 
as to how it should be decided. . . .”14 
In the six decades since its passage, courts have continued to debate 
the contours of these criteria. A full description of that debate is 
unnecessary here. Suffice it to say that lower courts continue to tangle 
over the precise meaning of the elements of § 1292(b). Thus, it is not clear 
how “controlling” an issue of law must be, that is, whether a reversal of 
the district court decision would necessarily lead to a final judgment for 
10. Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 17770 (1958). 
11. “When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under 
this section, shall be of the opinion that such an order involves a controlling issue of law as to which 
there is a substantial grounds for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order 
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such 
order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such 
order, if application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order: Provided, however, That an 
application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district 
judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018) (emphasis 
in original). 
12. Charles Allan Wright, The Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 23 F.R.D. 199, 202 (1959)
(footnote omitted). For further discussions of the legislative history, see Solimine, supra note 5, at 
1171–72; Note, Interlocutory Appeals In the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 607, 610–12 (1975).  
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018). 
14. Wright, supra note 12, at 204 (quoting the legislative history).
4
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the appealing party.15 Some authorities suggest that a reversal can be 
considered to have met this language, even if it would not in inexorably 
lead to a reversal of a final judgment against the appealing party, “if 
interlocutory reversal might save time for the district court, and time and 
expense for the litigants.”16 Similarly, some courts have been unclear 
about how to interpret a question of law in this context, as presumably 
opposed to one of fact, or an issue typically left to district court 
discretion.17 
Nor has it been clear how to determine if there is a “substantial 
ground for a difference of opinion,” or if an immediate appeal will 
“materially advance the termination of the litigation.” Many courts, not 
surprisingly or inappropriately, appear to assume that the statutory criteria 
should be applied in an interrelated fashion, so that if there is a controlling 
issue of law, an immediate appeal will likely advance the termination of 
the litigation.18 
The most contentious issue regarding the interpretation of § 1292(b) 
has been the assertion that its use should be restricted to “exceptional” or 
“big” cases. Such a restriction has some basis in the legislative history, as 
already noted,19 as well as the common sense notion that if § 1292(b) is 
interpreted too broadly, it could generate too many appeals. But the 
restriction finds no basis in the legislative text, and properly understood 
the legislative history is simply referring to cases that, all things being 
equal, are more likely to satisfy the statutory criteria.20 
Nonetheless, these differing interpretations have persisted, in part, 
because the Supreme Court has frequently and favorably cited § 1292(b) 
as an option for litigants seeking interlocutory review, albeit in dicta and 
with relatively little discussion of the proper interpretation or application 
15. Solimine, supra note 5, at 1172. 
16. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3930, at 426 (2d 
ed. 1996) (footnote omitted). 
17. Id. at 427–29. 
18. Id. at 432–38; Solimine, supra note 5, at 1173 n.50. 
19. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
20. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3929 at 365–70 (arguing against “exceptional” case requirement 
on textual grounds and noting that many courts do not follow it); Solimine, supra note 5, at 1173, 
1193–95 (summarizing the dispute and arguing against a strict “big case” requirement). In referencing 
the legislative history of § 1292(b) and other laws in this Article, I am aware of contemporary norms 
of legislative interpretation that give the primary if not exclusive role to the text of the statute. I have 
previously argued that my views of the proper interpretation of § 1292(b) do not depend on what 
interpretative role, if any, one gives to legislative history in addition to the text. Solimine, supra note 
5, at 1193–94 n.152. I stand by this conclusion and extend it to the 1990 and 1992 laws discussed 
later in this Article. 
5
Solimine: Permissive Interlocutory Appeals
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
612 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:607 
of the criteria.21 (I shall have more to say below about the jurisprudential 
significance of these references for the scope of the collateral order 
doctrine.) Despite this lack of guidance, by and large the lower courts 
appear to be interpreting and applying § 1292(b) in a measured and useful 
way. The late Charles Alan Wright and his co-authors have persuasively 
argued that while § 1292(b) is designed “for the purpose of minimizing 
the total burdens of litigation on parties and the judicial system by 
accelerating or at least simplifying trial court proceedings,” it “might 
serve the additional purposes of avoiding that hardship does not result 
from the length of the proceedings alone, or of providing a vehicle for 
appellate review of issues that characteristically evade review on appeal 
from a final judgment.”22 They continue: “[T]he flexible procedures of 
§ 1292(b) would offer many advantages over the often contorted finality
doctrines that courts have found useful or even necessary[,]” and that 
“[l]iteralistic interpretation of the [statutory criteria] should not stand in 
the way.”23 
21. See, e.g., Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 416 (2015); Mohawk Indus., Inc.
v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 110–11 (2009); Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 46–47 
(1995); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 883 (1994); Gulfstream Aerospace 
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 288 (1988); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 
529–30 (1988); Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Kollar, 472 U.S. 424, 435 (1985); Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378 n.13 (1981); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474–75 
(1978). See also Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty., 527 U.S. 198, 210 (1999) (referring to interlocutory 
appeal options found in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)–(c)). But see Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 74 
(1996) (asserting that “[r]outine resort to § 1292(b) requests would hardly comport with Congress’ 
design to reserve interlocutory review for ‘exceptional’ cases while generally retaining for the federal 
courts a firm final judgment rule.”) (quoting Coppers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978) 
(quoting Fisons, Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
1041 (Apr. 3,1972)).  
22. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 439 (footnotes omitted). 
23. Id. at 441. This pragmatic approach is arguably illustrated by two influential decisions by 
Judge Richard Posner. In Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trustees, 219 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2000), a district judge 
had denied a defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case on the 
ground that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of retaliation. But without explanation, the 
district judge certified a § 1292(b) appeal. Id. at 676. Judge Posner found that the statutory criteria 
had not been satisfied. Conceding that those criteria “unfortunately, are not as crystalline as they 
might be,” the statute, he held, “was not intended to make denials of summary judgment routinely 
appealable,” in part because “to decide whether summary judgment was properly granted requires 
hunting through the record” assembled in support of and opposing the motion. Id. at 676–77. That 
would be at variance with the statute’s limit to issues of law. Contrast Ahrenholz with In re Text 
Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2010). There the appellate court, again by 
Posner, held that a denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in an antitrust case did satisfy the 
§ 1292(b) criteria. The appeal did not seek the review or overturning of findings of fact, but rather
presented a controlling issue of law (even though a reversal was not certain to end the case, id. at 
624), namely the sufficiency of pleadings in light of the Supreme Court’s then-relatively recent 
decision of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Ahrenholz was distinguished on the 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 53 [2019], Iss. 3, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/4
2019] PERMISSIVE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS 613 
Almost 30 years ago I advanced similar views, arguing that a broader 
reading of the statute was compatible with the statutory text and 
legislative history. It would also be appropriate in light of the dual 
certification requirement (which means two levels of courts have 
presumably considered but rejected the usual disruptive effects of 
interlocutory appeals), could lead to more settlements (by making the law 
clearer in a particular case) and expose the courts of appeals to a richer 
diet of issues (including those often subsumed in a final judgment), which 
could systematically inure to the benefit of district and appellate judges, 
and litigants.24 Even when the appellate court affirms the decision, that 
does not show that an immediate appeal was unnecessary, because it will 
likely clarify a legal issue for that case, and other similar cases.25 A 
broader use of § 1292(b) is also supported by a recognition of fewer cases 
going to trial in the federal system (and fewer appeals from trials), with 
the concomitant rise in the importance of pretrial rulings, especially 
(though not only) those potentially dispositive of the case.26 
Taken as a whole, both district courts and courts of appeals appear to 
be applying § 1292(b) in a measured fashion, and it has neither fallen into 
disuse nor carved out a significant exception to the final judgment rule. 
The Administrative Office (AO) of the U.S. Courts collects some data on 
the use of § 1292(b), but has not publicly reported that data for several 
basis that the case did not involve “hunting through a record,” and this case did present the then-
unsettled issue of how to apply Twombly, especially in antitrust cases. Id. at 626.  
24. See Solimine, supra note 5, at 1179–83. As Professor Wright notes, WRIGHT, supra note 
16, at 439 n.49, a narrower view of the statute, than that favored by Wright or myself, is advanced in 
Note, supra note 12, at 609, which would limit the its application “to vindicate only . . . the avoidance 
of unnecessary trial proceedings.” Id. This focus would exclude the additional goals of “providing an 
opportunity to review orders of the trial court before they irreparably modify the rights of the 
litigants,” or to supervise “the development of the law by providing a mechanism for resolving 
conflicts among trial courts on issues not normally open on final appeal.” Id. (footnotes omitted). The 
Note argues, among other things, that the examples given in the legislature history are more supportive 
of a narrower application of the statute. Id. at 611–12. In a recent decision acknowledging the 
existence and relevance of § 1292(b), albeit without directly discussing its application, the Supreme 
Court somewhat incongruously added a “see generally” cite to both my article, Solimine, supra note 
5, and the Note, supra note 12. Gelboim, 574 U.S. 405, 416. Professor Wright and his treatise co-
authors are not cited, though they argue for a flexible approach to interpreting the statute, see WRIGHT, 
supra note 16, § 3939 at 370. It would be inappropriate to glean any strong view about the differing 
approaches to § 1292(b) from these spare citations.  
25. See Solimine, supra note 5, at 1198. 
26. See Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1240–
41 (2007). See also Pauline Kim, et al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 92 (2009) (pointing out that “a substantial portion of the district judge’s 
work” are various pretrial rulings that “are usually not final decisions and therefore are only rarely 
reviewed by courts of appeals.”) (footnote omitted); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil 
Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012) (stating that in recent years only about 1% 
of cases go to trial in the federal courts).  
7
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decades.27 Three decades ago I accessed data from the AO, and it showed 
an average of about 280 certifications from the district courts during a 
five-year period. And of those, about 100 or 36% were accepted on 
average each year by the courts of appeals.28 
To determine if the use of § 1292(b) had changed over two decades 
later, I again accessed data from the AO for the years 2015 to 2019 
regarding the number and disposition of § 1292(b) appeals accepted by 
the circuit courts.29 The relevant data is collected in the Appendix to this 
Article. As the Appendix indicates, the data for recent years is remarkably 
similar to the previous period.30 For each year, the number of terminations 
on the merits of cases that come up via § 1292(b) for all of the circuits 
ranged from 106 to 80, with a yearly average of 93.2. Indeed, the number 
of such appeals resulting in decisions on the merits in the circuit courts 
was slightly below the analogous figures some thirty years ago. 
Complimentary data has recently been reported by researchers at the 
Federal Judicial Center.31 They accessed data from the AO from October 
1, 2013, through June 30, 2019, and found that 636 applications under § 
27. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3929 at 363. 
28. Solimine, supra note 5, at 1176 (reporting data by circuit from 1985 to 1989). Certification 
by the courts of appeals was over 50% in the 1960s, id. at 1174, and the lower rate years later might 
be attributable to concerns over higher caseloads. 
29. I am grateful to Gary Yakimov, Chief Data Officer, Judiciary Data & Analysis Office,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and his colleagues for supplying me with this data, 
since it is not reported in this detail in the AO’s Annual Report. See e-mail from Gary Yakimov, Chief 
Data Officer, Judiciary Data & Analysis Office, Administrative Office of the United States Courts to 
author (August 26, 2019, 4:35 PM) (on file with author). Mr. Yakimov and his colleagues do not 
necessarily share any of my analysis of the data. The AO’s Annual Report reports data on the 
termination of all interlocutory appeals in the circuits (i.e., under § 1292(b), FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), and 
various other proceedings), see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. 2.7 (2018), but does not further provide the detail on § 1292(b) 
reported in the Appendix. 
30. The data reflects the terminations on the merits of accepted § 1292(b) appeals on a yearly 
basis, as of June 30 on the five years in question, for all circuits except the Federal Circuit. 
Unfortunately, the recent data does not include information on how many applications for certification 
from district courts were filed in the circuit courts during the years in question, and per the dual 
certification requirement accepted by the appellate court. As of 2010, these applications were treated 
and counted in as appeals and were not separately accounted for. See e-mail from Tiffanie Snyder, 
Appellate, BAP and Judges Program Manager, Department of Program Services, Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts, to Michael E. Solimine (Aug. 28, 2019, 3:24 PM) (citing Memorandum on 
New Statistical Reporting Requirements for Courts of Appeals and Bankruptcy Appellate Panels from 
Steven R. Schlesinger, Chief Statistics Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts to 
Clerks, United States Courts of Appeals and Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (Sept. 20, 2011)) (e-mail 
and memorandum on file with author). 
31. EMERY G. LEE III, JASON A. CATONE & KRISTIN A. GARRI, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,
PERMISSIVE INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS, 2013-2019 (2020). 
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1292(b) were terminated in the Courts of Appeals during that period.32 Of 
those, 101 were terminated on procedural grounds, and of the reminder, 
52% were granted.33 The number of appellate decisions on the merits 
generated by § 1292(b) is very similar to that reported in the Appendix, 
while the rate of granting applications is higher than that found thirty years 
ago. 
With regard to certification by district courts, it is sometimes 
suggested that district judges are especially reluctant to voluntarily certify 
§ 1292(b) appeals given the potentially disruptive effect of such appeals
on normal case management.34 Whether these assumptions are well-
grounded is not clear.35 So to gauge recent judicial behavior, I conducted 
a study of judicial rulings on motions to certify § 1292(b) appeals in 2018. 
There were 248 such rulings, and 39 (15.7%) were granted.36 
These are obviously small numbers given the large civil dockets of 
both courts. If anything, it suggests both district courts and the court of 
appeals are reluctant to certify such appeals. This is especially true given 
that there is no indication that § 1292(b) certification requests are 
overwhelming either the district or circuit courts, and that the Supreme 
Court itself has frequently touted the use of § 1292(b) as a 
Congressionally-sanctioned avenue for interlocutory appeals. 
32. Id. at 1–2. 
33. Id. The FJC reports variation among the circuits, with among other things the Second, Fifth, 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits having relatively higher rates of granting applications, and higher numbers 
of appeals decided on the merits, as compared to other circuits. Id. at 2. This is similar to the data 
reported in the Appendix. 
34. E.g., Daniel Klerman, Posner and Class Actions, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (2019);
Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 89, 108–09 (1975). 
35. As far as I know, there is no official complication of data on how often § 1292(b) motions 
are made and of the rate on which they are granted or denied. In my prior study, I conducted a review 
of officially published decisions by district judges on motions to certify § 1292(b) appeals, and for 
the three years of 1987 through 1989, found that there were 102 such decisions, with 61 of those being 
granted. See Solimine, supra note 5, at 1197–98. 
36. The search on Lexis for the decisions used “1292(b)” as a search term. See e-mail from
Alisher Kassym to Michael E. Solimine (Oct. 3, 2019, 1:25 PM) (on file with author). A list of the 
decisions and their dispositions are on file with the author. The much greater number of decisions 
from one year, as opposed the smaller number over three years I previously found (see supra note 35) 
is likely due in large part to the prior study being restricted to officially published decisions, while 
the one from 2018 included both those and officially unpublished decisions only reported on Lexis. 
That said, data from one year from a database that likely does not capture all such motions should be 
viewed with some caution. Anecdotally, it seems that some district judges and U.S. Magistrate Judges 
are lukewarm at best to granting § 1292(b) motions, still insisting that the issues be “exceptional.” 
See, e.g., Bailey v. Verso Corp., No. 3:17-cv-332, 2019 WL 665354, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2019) 
(denying motion); Pinkston v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Regents, No. 8:18-cv-2651-T-33SPF, 2019 WL 
1877340, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2019) (same, and referring to § ”1292(b)’s high burden”). 
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B. The Juliana and Trump Litigations 
Despite its value to federal judges and lawyers, it must be admitted 
that § 1292(b) has a relatively low profile outside the legal community 
(and maybe inside that community too). There have been two high-profile 
exceptions to this generalization in the past two years. 
One is the Juliana v. United States climate change case. That was a 
case brought in 2015 by a group of children in federal court in Oregon, 
who argued that actions, or inaction, by the federal government to 
ameliorate the deleterious effects of climate change in general and the rise 
of greenhouse gases in particular was violating their constitutional rights. 
The case raises a host of complex procedural and substantive issues, 
including standing, the political question doctrine, substantive due process 
and other constitutional law doctrines, and the propriety of the wide-
ranging injunctive sought by the plaintiffs against the federal 
government.37 
Both the Obama and Trump administrations defended the case by 
filing motions to dismiss on the grounds mentioned above. The district 
judge denied the motions,38 and further denied a motion to certify a 
§ 1292(b) appeal.39 Seeking to avoid discovery and a trial on the merits,
the government then attempted interlocutory review by writs of 
mandamus, which were denied by the Ninth Circuit. Undeterred, the 
government sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. In two orders 
in 2018, the Supreme Court denied the writs without prejudice but 
remanded for further consideration of the government’s defenses. In 
unusually blunt language, the Court in the first order observed that the 
“breadth” of plaintiffs’ “claims [were] striking,” and added that “the 
justiciability of those claims presents substantial ground for difference of 
opinion,” a seeming reference to the language of § 1292(b), though the 
statute was not cited.40 In the second order, denying a stay until a writ of 
mandamus could be ruled upon, the Court noted that the district court had 
failed to certify a § 1292(b) appeal, and further quoted its earlier order 
paraphrasing the language of the statute.41 The Court denied the stay in 
37. For a useful discussion of all of these issues, see Bradford Mank, Does the Evolving
Concept of Due Process in Obergefell Justify Judicial Regulation of Greenhouse Gases and Climate 
Change?: Juliana v. United States, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855 (2018). 
38. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Ore. 2016). 
39. Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC, 2017 WL 2483705, at *2 (D. Ore. June 8, 
2017). The district judge adopted a report and recommendation of the U.S. Magistrate Judge assigned 
to the case to deny the certification. Id. 
40. United States v. U.S. District Court, 139 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2018). 
41. In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 452, 453 (2018). 
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part because the government had not first requested mandamus relief from 
the Ninth Circuit, but in doing so the Court seem to be strongly suggesting 
that the courts below use § 1292(b) as a vehicle to obtain immediate 
appellate review of the defenses.42 
If only reluctantly, the lower courts followed that advice. Not long 
after, the district judge revisited the § 1292(b) motion by reviewing the 
protracted litigation to date, noting at some length the values of the final 
judgment rule and what she considered to be the narrow interpretation of 
that statute.43 “Trial courts across the country[,]” she added, “address 
complex cases involving similar jurisdictional, evidentiary, and legal 
questions as those presented here without resorting to certifying for 
interlocutory appeal.”44 While “stand[ing]” by her “prior rulings on 
jurisdictional and merits issues,” the court acknowledged that she took 
“particular note of the recent orders” by the Supreme Court, and “upon 
reconsideration” and without further explanation certified the § 1292(b) 
appeal.45 
Shortly thereafter, a panel on the Ninth Circuit accepted the appeal, 
with the court explanation that the “district court properly concluded that 
the issues presented in this case satisfied the standard set forth in 
§ 1292(b) and properly exercised its discretion in certifying the case for
interlocutory appeal.”46 One judge on the panel issued a four-page dissent. 
The dissenting judge stated that despite the holding by the district judge, 
that decision, when “read as a whole,” indicated that the district judge did 
not think that the § 1292(b) criteria had been satisfied.47 The dissent added 
disapprovingly that the district judge seems to have “felt compelled” to 
certify “even though—as the rest of its order suggests—the court did not 
believe it to be true.”48 Given the language of § 1292(b) and the district 
court’s “superior vantage point,” the dissent concluded that the lower 
court’s de facto failure to certify deprived the appellate court of 
jurisdiction.49 
There is much to process in Juliana from a § 1292(b) perspective. 
And then, about seven months later, we were presented with yet another 
42. See id. 
43. Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA, 2018 WL 6303774, at *1–2 (D. Or. Nov.
21, 2018). 
44. Id. at *3. 
45. Id. 
46. Order at 2, Juliana v. United States, 949 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). 
47. Id. at 1127 (Friedland, J., dissenting).
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 1128 (Friedland, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed the district
court’s decision on the merits. See Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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high profile decision on § 1292(b), the Fourth Circuit’s decision in In re 
Donald J. Trump.50 That case was a highly publicized suit by the District 
of Columbia and the State of Maryland in Maryland federal court, against 
the President, on the basis that his continued business interests resulted in 
his receiving money and benefits from foreign governments and persons 
which, it was argued, violated the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments 
Clauses.51 Not unlike the Juliana case, the district court heard, and denied, 
a series of motions to dismiss on the basis of, among other things, lack of 
standing, and for failure to state a claim.52 The district judge also refused 
to certify a § 1292(b), on the basis that the statutory criteria had not been 
met.53 The President then sought a writ of mandamus in the court of 
appeals, seeking an order that the district judge to certify the appeal. 
The Fourth Circuit granted the writ of mandamus. While 
acknowledging the discretion granted district judges under § 1292(b), the 
court held that the district court abused its discretion by not concluding 
that there was substantial ground for a difference of opinion.54 The court 
noted that the district court issued the first decision ever holding that a 
party could pursue relief for alleged violation of the Emoluments Clauses 
for alleged competitive injury, and that the holding was contrary to a 
recent prior decision in the Southern District of New York: in a virtually 
identical case brought by different plaintiffs.55 The court also concluded 
that the other criteria of § 1292(b) had been met.56 Still, the court went out 
of its way to emphasize that granting a writ of mandamus in these 
circumstances “should be rare and occur only when a clear abuse of 
discretion is demonstrated,” and also mentioned, albeit with little 
elaboration, the “unique circumstances of this case.”57 The court 
proceeded to immediately reach the merits of the case, rather than 
“pointlessly go[ing] through the motions of certifying.”58 
50. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019). 
51. Id. at 362. 
52. Id. at 362–64. 
53. District of Columbia v. Trump, 344 F. Supp. 3d 828, 841 (D. Md. 2018). 
54. See In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 369–70. 
55. Id. at 370–71. 
56. Id. at 371–72. 
57. Id. at 372 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. In a very similar case with similar litigation history, brought in the District of Columbia, 
the D.C. Circuit, relying in part on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in In re Trump, denied a writ of 
mandamus without prejudice, and remanded to the district court “for immediate reconsideration of 
the motion to certify” under § 1292(b). In re Trump, 781 Fed. Appx. 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per 
curiam). See also Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 17-1154 (EGS), 2019 WL 3948478 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 
2019) (certifying § 1292(b) appeal after remand), appeal accepted, In re Trump, No. 19-8005, 2019 
WL 4200443 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4, 2019), rev’d, 949 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (per curiam). 
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The panel decision was reversed by the Fourth Circuit sitting en 
banc.59 An eight-judge majority held that mandamus relief was 
inappropriate because the district judge’s decision not to certify a § 
1292(b) appeal was essentially unreviewable. The majority argued that 
the text and legislative history of § 1292(b) clearly indicated that both the 
district and appellate court was vested with discretion whether or not to 
allow an appeal under that provision.60 It follows, the court continued, that 
for mandamus purposes there was no “clear and indisputable” right to 
have an appeal certified, and to allow it would be “particularly 
problematic when doing so circumvents the specific process Congress has 
prescribed for seeking interlocutory review.”61 The majority did not rule 
out the possibI have not seen this in the federal reporter yetility of issuing 
a writ of mandamus in an “appropriate case” in this context, but it must 
be one where the district court “ignored a request for certification, denied 
such a request based on nothing more than caprice, or made its decision 
in manifest bad faith.”62 But those circumstances were not present here, 
the court concluded, because the “district court promptly recognized and 
ruled on the request for certification in a detailed written opinion that 
applied the correct legal standards.”63 
Six judges dissented on the § 1292(b) issue. The principal dissent on 
that point64 argued, similar to the original panel, that the “district court’s 
orders are paradigmatic orders for certification under § 1292(b), and that 
the district court clearly abused its discretion and usurped appellate 
jurisdiction in refusing to certify them.”65 The dissent allowed that while 
§ 1292(b) “indisputably confers broad discretion upon district courts . . .
the statute does not provide that a district court’s exercise of that 
discretion is unfettered and unreviewable.”66 “A holistic review of the 
district court’s decisions,” the dissent continued, “reveals both a clear 
abuse of discretion . . . and a judicial usurpation of power in this most 
unusual case against the President,” making mandamus relief 
appropriate.67 
59. In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274 ( 4th Cir.2020) (en banc). 
60. Id. at 282–83. 
61. Id. at 283. 
62. Id. at 285. 
63. Id.
64. Id. at 309 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkinson separately dissented on other issue, 
but noted that he agreed with Judge Niemeyer’s dissent regarding § 1292(b). Id. at 291 n.1 (Wilkinson, 
J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 315 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
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C. Section 1292(b) Litigation, Circa 2020 
The Juliana and Trump cases were unusual in many ways, but they 
can still provide insights on more conventional litigation involving 
§ 1292(b). For one thing, both cases seem classic examples of the
appropriate use of the statute, and the district judges can be fairly 
criticized for not granting motions to certify at least some of the issues in 
the cases. The standing and substantive due process claims in Juliana, and 
the state standing and Emoluments Clauses claims in Trump, stand out as 
issues that seem to readily satisfy the statutory criteria. That is, all of those 
claims were not routine ones (either fact-intensive or resolvable by settled 
law), and their resolution would likely “materially advance” the litigation: 
potentially ending them in favor of one of the parties. For another thing, 
both cases easily satisfy any requirement of “exceptional” litigation or a 
“big case” (however those terms might be defined) given the parties and 
the high-profile political stakes involved.68 
In addition to not certifying the cases, the district judge decisions 
were also characterized by their limited or unsatisfactory explanations. I 
have earlier observed that an appreciable number of district and circuit 
decisions certifying, or not certifying, under § 1292(b) do not discuss the 
statutory requirements in detail, and instead simply recite the language 
with little elaboration.69 That was true in Juliana. The district judge there 
issued a decision that could be (and was, by one circuit judge) interpreted 
as holding that the criteria were not met, yet then proceeded to certify the 
68. On this point, it is worth noting President Trump contributed to § 1292(b) jurisprudence in 
another case. In In re Trump, 874 F.3d 948 (6th Cir. 2017), the court of appeals accepted a 
certification. The case grew out of a campaign rally by then-presidential candidate Trump, where he 
responded to protesters by saying, among other things, “Get ‘em out of here.” Allegedly in response, 
three protesters were assaulted by others at the rally, and they subsequently sued Trump in federal 
court in Kentucky for “incitement to riot,” which is prohibited by Kentucky statutes. The district court 
denied a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but certified a § 1292(b) appeal. Both the district and appellate courts 
held that there was a “controlling issue of law,” since it involved the interpretation of statutes, and 
there was a legal question of whether the statutes violated the First Amendment. Also, there was a 
“substantial ground for difference of opinion,” since (the Sixth Circuit said) “fair-minded jurists might 
reach” different conclusions on the First Amendment defense, and an “immediate appeal may 
materially advance the termination of the litigation,” since “litigation would end” if the defense were 
accepted. The court added that to fall under § 1292(b), a case must be “exceptional,” and however 
one might define that term, this case satisfied it, since it was “exceptional in many waysFalseThe 
practical and political consequences of [this] case are readily apparent.” Id. at 951–52. Subsequently, 
after briefing on the merits, the court reversed the denial of the motion to dismiss, holding that 
Trump’s speech enjoyed First Amendment protection because it did not specifically advocate 
imminent lawless action. Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 613 (6th Cir. 2018). 
69. Solimine, supra note 5, at 1200. 
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appeal.70 Likewise, while the initial Fourth Circuit panel decision in 
Trump had considered it a “paradigmatic case for certification,”71 in part 
because there was a substantial ground for a difference of opinion on the 
standing issue, given the conflicting district court ruling in another 
circuit.72 Earlier in its opinion, the court of appeals described the district 
judge’s decision refusing certification as one that “reiterated [the] 
reasoning of its earlier rulings [on the merits].”73 
In my view, the initial panel decision correctly characterized the 
district judge’s decision. To its credit, the district court issued a full 
opinion on the § 1292(b) certification motion, but as I read it, much of the 
decision consists of summaries of the respective positions of the parties 
on certification.74 Beyond that, the district judge felt that the President 
was mostly expressing disagreement with the prior rulings denying his 
motions to dismiss, and likewise distinguished (and disagreed with) the 
district court decision from the Second Circuit.75 I’m not faulting the 
district judge for disagreeing with the other court, or for being confident 
in his earlier rulings, but that confidence does not prevent the satisfaction 
of the § 1292(b) criteria. 
Both Juliana and Trump also present the issue of whether an 
appellate court should use the writ of mandamus to review a district 
judge’s decision not to certify a § 1292(b) appeal. The issuance of such a 
70. See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text. The district court was not a model of clarity 
in deciding a motion to certify in its two encounters with the issue. In its first decision on a motion to 
certify, the district judge referred the recertification issue to a U.S. Magistrate Judge, who then issued 
a Report and Recommendation. Cf. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3929 at 373 (stating that the 
“certification power cannot be delegated to a magistrate judge in a case tried by a district judge,” but 
citing a case where the Magistrate Judge had decided the issue without issuing a report and without 
further review by the district judge). Id. at 373 n.29 (citing Vitols v. Citizens Banking Co., 984 F.2d 
168 (6th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)). However, the Magistrate Judge’s decision, Juliana v. United States, 
No. 6:15-cv-1517-TC, 2017 WL 9249531 (D. Ore. May 1, 2017) (Coffin, M.J.), for the most part 
simply reiterates the merits discussion in a previous report which recommended that motions to 
dismiss be denied. The court cited the statutory language, but on my reading, did not explicitly discuss 
why the criteria had not been met, with the exception of the “question of law” requirement. On that 
front, the court observed that “numerous factual questions” on climate change would need to be 
addressed at trial. Id. at *8. That’s true, but there were several antecedent defenses raised (e.g., 
standing; the political question and public trust doctrines) that presented relatively pure questions of 
law. With virtually no discussion, the district court accepted the Magistrate Judge’s decision. See 
supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
71. In re Trump, 928 F.3d at 371. 
72. Id. at 371–72. 
73. Id. at 368. 
74. District of Columbia v. Trump, 344 F. Supp. 3d 828, 833–36 (D. Md. 2018).
75. Id. at 834, 836–39. The decision from the S.D.N.Y. was subsequently reversed (by a
noninterlocutory appeal) in a 2-1 decision. See CREW v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2019). That 
decision does not undermine the point made in the text, since there was conflicting authority at the 
time the district judge in the Fourth Circuit declined to certify the appeal. 
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writ would permit the circuit court to certify an appeal and proceed to hear 
it on the merits. The straightforward argument against that option is that 
it flouts the dual certification requirement of the statute. That requirement 
was put in place to limit the number of interlocutory appeals. If the court 
of appeals is permitted to review and potentially reverse a failure of a 
district judge to certify, that results in unilateral certification. Once the 
district judge refuses to certify, the § 1292(b) option comes to an end.76 
Most decisions recognize this point,77 while adding that a litigant is not 
totally without recourse, since it can instead seek a mandamus review 
“directed to the underlying order.”78 
Yet there is a circuit split on this issue.79 The contrary argument 
against unreviewable district court discretion points out that § 1292(b) 
states that a district judge “shall” certify if the criteria are met, and argues 
that the statutory text and the legislative history does not explicitly forbid 
review (by mandamus, at least) by the appellate court.80 Also supporting 
review, it is argued is that even those courts in the no-review camp 
sometimes strongly suggest that the district court should after remand 
certify the appeal, given the appeals court conclusion that the criteria had 
been satisfied.81 This seems tantamount to review of the certification order 
by the appellate court, despite earlier disclaimers that no such review is 
possible. If the no-review position is so correct, it might be argued, then 
appellate courts should not gratuitously (or perhaps not so gratuitously 
after all) advise the district judge to certify an appeal. 
Aspects of this debate were played out in the Juliana and Trump 
litigation. Recall that in Juliana, the district judge once refused to certify, 
but later did so after the Supreme Court, not once but twice, strongly 
76. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3929 at 371–73.
77. E.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 344 F.3d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Powerhouse Licensing, 
LLC, 441 F.3d 467, 471 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006); Arthur Young & Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 
698 (9th Cir. 1977); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 755 n.1 (3d Cir. 1973).  
78. Ford Motor, 344 F.3d at 654. 
79. As it is described in In re Trump, 781 Fed. Appx. 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam). 
80. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A
Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 779–85 (2006); 
Mackenzie M. Horton, Comment, Mandamus, Stop in the Name of Discretion: The Judicial “Myth” 
of the District Court’s Absolute and Unreviewable Discretion in Section 1292(B) Certification, 64 
BAYLOR L. REV. 976, 985–86, 991–96 (2012). 
81. Horton, supra note 80, at 989–91 (discussing, inter alia, Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671
F.2d 426, 431–32 (11th Cir. 1982)); DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114, 123 (3d Cir. 1982); In re 
McClelland Eng’rs, Inc., 742 F.2d 837, 837–38 (5th Cir. 1984)). See also In re Gee, 941 F.3d 153, 
172–73 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (not directly addressing whether mandamus can be used to review 
district court’s denial of § 1292(b) motion, but denying mandamus petition without prejudice, and 
strongly suggesting that district judge on remand certify a § 1292(b) appeal on whether plaintiffs have 
standing).  
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encouraged the judge to so certify. And so the district judge did, as did the 
Ninth Circuit.82 The initial panel decision of the Fourth Circuit in Trump 
argued at length that the district judge’s refusal to certify was “a clear 
abuse of discretion.”83 It then held that “there is no mechanism for prompt 
appellate review . . . and because the district court erred so clearly . . . we 
conclude that granting the President’s petition for mandamus is 
appropriate.”84 It supported this holding by referencing a few cases from 
other circuits that had held that mandamus review was appropriate,85 
though it also stated that such review should be “rare” and only when there 
was a “clear abuse of discretion.”86 
The arguments advanced in favor of some type of review of district 
judge denials of certification, at least in some cases, are not without force. 
For a variety of reasons, at least some of the legal issues in both Juliana 
and Trump seem appropriate for § 1292(b) certification, and one is 
tempted to agree that at least in such cases, rare in number, mandamus 
review of the district court’s decision not to certify should be allowed. I 
nevertheless agree with Professor Wright and his co-authors that “the 
temptation should be resisted.”87 Even if the statute, literally read, does 
not forbid this result, the structure of § 1292(b) as a whole vests power in 
the district judge to certify, and the court of appeals only acts after such 
certification is lodged with it. It undermines this process to permit 
mandamus to review the district judge, even if for some undefined rare or 
exceptional cases. Perhaps some review mechanism should be put in 
place, but that is not how the statute is currently written.88 As the courts 
in the no-review camp have suggested, the better solution is to permit 
mandamus on the underlying district court decision directly, rather than 
“subvert the structure” of § 1292(b).89 Granted, this is no panacea. Any 
82. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that in the
Emoluments Clause litigation in the D.C. Circuit, see supra note 79, the district court, after declining 
to certify a § 1292(b) appeal, was admonished by the appellate court, and subsequently did certify the 
appeal, Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 17-1154 (EGS), 2019 WL 3948478 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2019), which 
was promptly accepted by the D.C. Circuit, In re Trump, No. 19-8005, 2019 WL 4200443 (D.C. Cir. 
Sept. 4, 2019). 
83. In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 371 (4th Cir. 2019). 
84. Id. at 371–72. 
85. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting the cases cited did not mention the circuit 
split on the issue, or the cases that held that mandamus review was inappropriate). 
86. Trump, 928 F.3d at 372. 
87. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 374 (footnote omitted). 
88. Id. at 374–75, 511. The Supreme Court’s rule-making authority under the 1990 and 1992
statutes might be another way to authorize review of no-certification decisions. See infra Part III(B). 
89. Id. at 511. Thus, I agree with the holding and analysis on this issue by the en banc majority 
in In re Trump. To the extent district courts are reluctant to certify § 1292(b) appeals in the first 
instance, see supra note 34, a robust embrace of mandamus review would inevitably lead to more 
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review by mandamus is meant to be narrow,90 and in contrast, review of 
a decision with dual certification under § 1292(b) is plenary.91 Still, 
mandamus review would be available to deal with the truly exceptional 
and unusual case, despite a questionable lack of certification by a district 
judge. On that score, a good case for review by mandamus can be made 
for at least some of the issues raised in Juliana and Trump, as compared 
to the more conventional litigation that characterizes the vast majority of 
cases in federal court. 
While Juliana and Trump are, to be sure, unusual cases, they can 
illustrate the appropriate use of § 1292(b) in ordinary civil litigation as 
well. Not every motion to certify an interlocutory decision by an unhappy 
litigant is going to satisfy the criteria of § 1292(b). But in my view, both 
district and court of appeals judges should not approach such motions with 
an effective presumption against (or in favor of) granting such motions. 
Instead, such certification requests should be viewed as another aspect of 
pretrial management, to be used when, after dispassionate consideration, 
the courts deem the statutory criteria to be satisfied. 
My embrace of § 1292(b) will not go down well with its critics, who 
argue that the statute’s myriad requirements—dual certification; the 
sometimes hard-to-apply criteria; the sometimes-applied “exceptional, 
big-case” factor—all make it an awkward and relatively little-used option 
for interlocutory appeal.92 Instead, they argue that developing precise 
criteria to ex ante designate certain types of orders as worthy of immediate 
review is an impossible task, and typically argue that the court of appeals 
should instead be vested with discretion to decide whether to hear an 
interlocutory appeal on a case-by-case basis, balancing the pros and cons 
of allowing an interlocutory appeal for that particular case.93 I am not 
oblivious to this critique but do not find it convincing. The proposed 
alternatives are not without their own weaknesses, such as potentially 
such certifications being sought in the trial courts, and more efforts to seek appellate review of denials 
of such motions. These are not necessarily bad things, but they could be the unintended consequence 
of ignoring the present statutory scheme. Also, although I am no fan of the collateral order doctrine, 
in part because it has been undermined by the use of § 1292(b), see infra Part III, infra, nonetheless 
perhaps that doctrine might be another basis to secure appellate review of district court decisions in 
some instances. 
90. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). For further discussion of the
sometimes unclear elements appellate courts apply in deciding whether to grant or deny mandamus, 
see Steinman, supra note 26, at 1257–70. 
91. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3929.1 at 414. 
92. E.g., Martineau, supra note 3, at 767–70; Redish, supra note 34, at 108–09.
93. Martineau, supra note 3, at 786–87; Redish, supra note 34, at 92–96. See also John C.
Nagle, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with Discretionary 
Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 214–22 (2004) (agreeing with Martineau proposal). 
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creating a new stream of satellite litigation in the appellate courts. This 
potential would surely follow after the institution of a policy to entertain 
and decide all, or nearly all, motions to certify interlocutory appeals on a 
case-by-case basis. More importantly, § 1292(b), for all of its 
complications, in my view, tolerably accommodates the pros and cons of 
permitting some interlocutory appeals, and in practice has been used more 
often that realized to send a wide variety of district court orders for 
immediate appellate review.94 
III. THE TWILIGHT OF THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE
The collateral order doctrine is another exception to the final 
judgment rule. As typically articulated by courts, it has no direct 
connection to permissive interlocutory appeals under § 1292(b). But there 
are indirect connections, and as I will argue, the continued viability and 
use of the latter should have negative jurisprudential consequences for the 
former. In this section, I outline the collateral order doctrine, the 
considerable criticisms it has long endured, and suggest how the existence 
of § 1292(b), and the Supreme Court’s rule-making authority on 
interlocutory appeals established by statutes in 1990 and 1992, should 
limit the further development of the doctrine, and perhaps even herald its 
demise. 
A. The Collateral Order Doctrine and Its Discontents 
The genesis of the collateral order doctrine is the Supreme Court’s 
decision in 1949 in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.95 In an 
opinion by Justice Robert Jackson, the Court construed the final judgment 
rule to permit an immediate appeal of a trial court decision in a diversity, 
94. WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3931 (giving numerous examples of orders certified under
§ 1292(b)); Solimine, supra note 5, at 1204–05 (same through 1990, including numerous cases that
have reached the Supreme Court). For a sampling of more recent Supreme Court cases decided on the 
merits, that reached the Court via § 1292(b), see Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480 (2015); 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005); 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & 
Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Breur v. Jim’s Concrete of 
Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691 (2003); Bartnicki v. Vooper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Harris Trust & Sav. 
Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000). One might argue that greater use of 
§ 1292(b) appeals, as suggested in Part II of this Article, will lead to a torrent of motions for such
appeals at the district court level. There is always such a possibility, but it can be policed by careful 
application of the statutory criteria, as well as district judge’s ability to sanction frivolous motions. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. See also Bryan Lammon, Three Ideas for Discretionary Appeals, 53 AKRON 
L. REV. 639 (2020) (proposing amendments to § 1292(b)). 
95. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
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shareholder derivative action, following a state law requiring the plaintiff 
to post security for payment of expenses if plaintiff were to lose the suit.96 
The Court acknowledged that the district court’s interlocutory decision 
would not ordinarily be appealable under the final judgment rule,97 but 
held that it was in this instance. The Court reasoned that the order was not 
related to the merits, and it would be “too late [to] effectively review” the 
decision on appeal from a final judgment.98 An order, then, could be 
immediately appealable if it was “separable from, and collateral to, rights 
asserted in the action,” was “too important to be denied review,” and was 
“too independent of the cause itself” to require the case to proceed to a 
final judgment.99 The Court added its analysis was supported by the fact 
that that it had “long given [§ 1291(a)] practical rather than a technical 
construction.”100 
A review of the many collateral order decisions from the Supreme 
Court, addressing other types of district court orders, is unnecessary 
here.101 Suffice it to say that the Court at first seemed to expansively apply 
the doctrine for almost three decades, then started to hold fewer examples 
of the Cohen criteria being met. A significant turning point, as some see 
it,102 was in 1978 when the Court unanimously held in Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay103 that denials of motions by plaintiffs to certify a class 
action were interlocutory decisions that did not qualify as a collateral 
order. As the doctrine comes down to us today, the Court has recently 
stated that it covers “[t]hat small category includ[ing] only decisions that 
are conclusive, that involve important questions separate from the merits, 
and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment 
in the underlying action.”104 
As Bryan Lammon has recently observed, “[r]arely is the collateral-
order doctrine mentioned without accompanying criticism.”105 This 
criticism might at first blush seem surprising. The invocation of 
pragmatism of Cohen is a mark of 20th century jurisprudence, and as 
96. Id. at 545–46. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 546. 
99. Id. 
100.  Id. 
 101.  For an overview of those decisions, see Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, and the 
Scope of Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1809, 1838–42 (2018); Steinman, supra note 26, 
at 1248–51. 
102.  Martineau, supra note 3, at 740–41. 
103.  Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). 
104.  Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Swint v. Chambers 
Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)). 
105.  Lammon, supra note 101, at 1842 (footnote omitted). 
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Stephen Yeazell has suggested: “the need for [interlocutory appeals] must 
have seemed more pressing with the adoption of procedural rules [i.e., the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938] that lengthened the pretrial 
process and made it less likely that cases would ever come to trial.”106 
And it is not hard to suggest that the doctrine might never had been 
announced in 1949 had § 1292(b) existed at the time. Consequently, 
Cohen might be viewed as a necessary precursor till § 1292(b) was 
enacted. 
But praise for Cohen, despite these factors and its distinguished 
author, was not meant to be. Among the subsequent criticisms is the basis 
for the doctrine: it is difficult to glean the multi-part test from the spare 
language, or the legislative purpose, of § 1291, so much so that it is de 
rigueur for commentators to instead label it as judicially created.107 To be 
sure, the Cohen decision claimed it was merely engaging in a “practical” 
rather than a “technical” interpretation of that statute which, it claimed, it 
had “long” done.108 The claim is unconvincing,109 but in a later case the 
Court went out of its way to emphasize that Cohen was engaging in 
statutory interpretation, not creating an exception to the statute.110 
More important than its provenance is the substantive critique that 
the Court (and lower courts) have been unable to apply the doctrine’s 
criteria in a consistent and principled fashion. In short, the Court has not 
been clear or consistent about how to determine if an order is an 
“important” one “separate from the merits,” or when an order is 
“effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”111 
 106.  Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. 
L. REV. 631, 662 (1994). 
 107.  E.g., Martineau, supra note 3, at 739 (“created by judicial decision”); Aaron R. Petty, The 
Hidden Harmony of Appellate Jurisdiction, 62 S.C. L. REV. 353, 360 (2010) (“judicially-crafted 
exception”); Redish, supra note 34, at 111 (“judicially created”); Steinman, supra note 26, at 1247 
(“judicial invention”). 
108.  Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
 109.  WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3911 at 332 (2d ed. 1992) (the “three cases relied upon to 
establish the ‘practical’ construction of the finality requirement provide only remote support for this 
result.”) (footnote omitted); Steinman, supra note 26, at 1249 & n.90 (pointing out that no case prior 
to Cohen had recognized an exception from the final judgment rule not grounded in a statute, and that 
none of the three cases the Court cited for its “long . . . practical” construction of § 1291 squarely 
supports such a construction). 
110.  Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994). 
111.  For useful overviews of the cases and the difficulties the Court has shown in applying the 
criteria in a coherent and consistent fashion, see RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A 
MODERN APPROACH 1098–1106 (7th ed. 2018); Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: 
A New “Serbonian Bog’ and Four Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 551–85 (1998); 
Lammon, supra note 101, at 1838–42; Petty, supra note 107, at 377–86; Steinman, supra note 26, at 
1250–57. It is no small irony that commentators have persuasively argued that in light of how the 
Cohen criteria have been applied in later cases, it’s doubtful that Cohen was rightly decided. See 
21
Solimine: Permissive Interlocutory Appeals
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
628 AKRON LAW REVIEW [53:607 
Apparently not oblivious to these criticisms, the Court has emphasized the 
“importance” of the issue from which immediate appeal is sought, a word 
found in all formulations of the doctrine going back to Cohen. The Court 
has suggested that the source of the right will inform its importance, so 
that a right “originating in the Constitution or statutes” should be regarded 
as more important than a “privately conferred right” created by a 
contract.112 But even that formulation still leaves open considerable 
uncertainties, such that it seems a “process of ad hoc balancing that 
focuses on the Court’s perception of the importance of the interest in 
avoiding trial.”113 
As examples of these criticisms, consider two well-known Court 
decisions, one holding the Cohen criteria to be met, the other not. In the 
aforementioned Coppers & Lybrand decision, the Court held that the 
criteria were not satisfied. In the space of one paragraph, the Court 
reasoned that a denial of class certification was not conclusive, since it 
could be revised by the district court; was not separate from the merits, 
since it “involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal 
issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action;” and was not effectively 
unreviewable after a final judgment, since the named plaintiff or 
intervening class members could then appeal the order.114 In the 
immediately following part of its opinion, the Court also rejected an 
analytically separate argument that an interlocutory appeal should be 
allowed if the denial of class certification would be the “death knell” of 
plaintiff’s case, since given the small amount of individual damages 
involved, the case could only be economically brought as a class action.115 
Martineau, supra note 3, at 742 (arguing that the harm of applying the state statute was only “financial, 
not legal” since the trial court order “would not prevent continuance of the suit, but at worst would 
only require the posting of security.”); Redish, supra note 34, at 112–13 (arguing that the Cohen 
decision “did not explain why refusing to allow immediate appeal in that case would result in 
irreparable loss.”). 
112.  Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994). 
 113.  MARCUS, supra note 111, at 1103. See also WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3911.5 at 430 (the 
importance requirement as had a “checkered career”). Yet another complication of the collateral order 
doctrine is that in practice, lawyers will frequently brief both whether the doctrine applies to permit 
an interlocutory appeal (if the cases are unclear with respect to that particular order), and the merits 
of the case. If the court decides that the doctrine is not satisfied, then the briefing on the merits has 
been wasted. Steinman, supra note 26, at 1271–72. In contrast, this can be avoided in § 1292(b) 
appeals, if the parties first brief, and a motions panel on the court of appeals first decides, whether to 
accept the appeal. That said, it is apparently not unusual for both the § 1292(b) issue and the merits 
to be briefed, and sometimes the same panel will decide both. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust 
Litigation, 630 F.3d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 2010). 
114.  Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978). 
115.  Id. at 477. See also WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3912 at 439–59 (discussing whether and to 
what extent the death knell doctrine fits with the collateral order doctrine). 
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On that point, the Court expressed concerns with the uncertainty of 
defining a “death knell”; with courts of appeals becoming bogged down 
in heavily factual, time-consuming disputes in applying that term in 
individual appeals; and with reconciling the proposed death-knell 
exception with the purposes of the final judgment rule, and the existence 
of § 1292(b) as an already-existing safety value to potentially hear such 
appeals.116 
On just the collateral order doctrine, the Court’s analysis, comprised 
of “three terse sentences,”117 is not a model of robust analysis. The Court’s 
reasoning was formalistically correct but arguably paid short shrift to the 
practicalities of class action litigation. Yes, an order denying class 
certification could be revisited by the district court, but that’s true of 
virtually any interlocutory decision. Yes, to various degrees the 
determination of whether the criteria of Rule 23 has been satisfied 
overlaps with the evidence to be presented on the merits of the case, but 
the degree can vary if it occurs at all.118 Finally, yes, a plaintiff can appeal, 
after final judgment, an order denying class certification, but that seems 
oblivious to the point that the plaintiff won’t pursue the suit at all if the 
denial is truly the “death-knell” of the case.119 
In another important decision, the Supreme Court held in 1985 in 
Mitchell v. Forsyth120 that in civil rights actions, denials of motions to 
dismiss or for summary judgment based on the qualified immunity 
defense satisfied the Cohen criteria and were immediately appealable. 
Properly understood, the Court held the qualified immunity defense was 
“an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,” 
116.  Id. at 471–76. 
 117.  Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action 
Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule23(f), 41 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1555 (2000). See also WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3912 at 459 (the 
collateral order doctrine was “easily put aside.”). 
118.  Subsequently, the Supreme Court held in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 
(2011), involving whether the Rule 23(a)(2) & (b) had been satisfied, that the inquiry “entail[ed] some 
overlap with the merits of plaintiff’s underlying claims.” Id. at 351 (citing, inter alia, Coopers & 
Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469). 
 119.  I am not necessarily arguing that the case was wrongly decided, only that it presented a 
more difficult issue under the Cohen criteria than the Court let on in one paragraph. As the Court itself 
observed, there was a circuit split on the issue. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 465, n.2. That said, 
the Court spent considerable time analyzing the “death knell” doctrine, and the possible use of 
§ 1292(b) as an alternative to the collateral order doctrine. On the latter point, the Court seemed
particularly influenced by a then-recent opinion by noted Judge Henry Friendly, extolling the benefits 
of § 1292(b) as an alternative to the doctrine to review class action certification decisions. Id. at 475 
n.27 (citing and quoting Parkinson v. April Indus., Inc., 520 F.2d 650, 660 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, 
J., concurring)). 
120.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
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and thus, was an “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to 
liability.”121 Thus, a denial of the defense made it “effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”122 Moreover, the Court 
explained that the immunity was an issue of law—an inquiry as to whether 
the “legal norms” the defendants allegedly violated were “clearly 
established” at the time, and thus, was “conceptually distinct from the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claim that his rights had been violated.”123 
Unlike the unanimous decision in Coopers & Lybrand, Mitchell was 
a 4-3 decision on the issue of appealability. In his partial dissent, Justice 
William Brennan argued that the qualified immunity defense “is not 
identical to the ultimate question on the merits, but the two are quite 
closely related.”124 He also argued that the defense was not conceptually 
different from other immunities, or other defenses like lack of jurisdiction 
or the statute of limitations, all of which are effectively lost if a trial court 
denial is not immediately reviewed.125 
I have recently argued that the dissent in Mitchell got the better of 
the argument.126 On the separate from the merits prong, I suggested that 
that the qualified immunity defense, with its inquiry into clearly 
established law at the time of the events giving rise to suit, “overlaps in 
most cases with the facts and merits of the case.”127 On the effectively 
unreviewable prong, I argued that the defense is much like lack of 
jurisdiction and many other “procedural” defenses that are completely lost 
if a motion to dismiss raising those issues is denied.128 I also observed that 
Mitchell (or Coopers & Lybrand, for that matter) had little explicit 
discussion of the “importance” of the defense raised. Recall that was a 
factor briefly mentioned in Cohen, and then resurrected in some decisions 
after Coopers & Lybrand and Mitchell were decided.129 On that front, the 
dispute in the former case was between private parties, governed by a 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure applicable to all litigation. It is difficult 
to label that as “important” in the sense of being drawn on the Constitution 
or federal statutes. On the other hand, for the latter case, the qualified 
immunity defense is a frequently litigated issue in civil rights actions 
121.  Id. at 526 (emphasis in original). 
122.  Id. at 526–27. 
123.  Id. at 527–28. 
124.  Id. at 545 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
125.  Id. at 551–53. 
126.  Michael E. Solimine, Are Interlocutory Qualified Immunity Appeals Lawful?, 94 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. ONLINE 169 (2019). 
127.  Id. at 176. 
128.  Id. at 177. 
129.  See supra notes 99, 112 and accompanying text. 
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involving public officials, and is drawn (at least in part) from federal 
statutes like 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so a better case can be made there for 
meeting the “importance” criterion.130 
B. Section 1292(b), Rulemaking, and the Collateral Order Doctrine 
Putting aside its ragged application, there are at least two reasons to 
suggest that the collateral order doctrine rests on shakable jurisprudential 
foundations, so much so that the doctrine might be narrowed even more 
than it is, or perhaps even abandoned entirely. One reason is the passage 
of § 1292(b) nine years after the Cohen decision. As I’ve pointed out,131 
the Court has frequently cited § 1292(b) in the course of decisions holding 
that a particular trial court order does not fall under the collateral order 
doctrine. The Court does this to emphasize that there is a safety valve 
available for litigants to possibly ameliorate, on a case-by-case basis, the 
sometimes-harsh effects of the final judgment rule. Permissive 
interlocutory appeals in this regard are particularly attractive, the Court 
has emphasized, since application of the collateral order doctrine requires 
the “blunt, categorical instrument” that an entire class of orders be subject 
to immediate appeal.132 In short, the Court seems to cite this safety valve 
as an additional justification to apply the doctrine in a (mostly) narrow 
fashion. Interestingly, the Court has sometimes not cited § 1292(b) on the 
few occasions it has held that the doctrine does apply to an order.133 The 
upshot is that the mere possibility of the use of the § 1292(b) option 
suggests a significant brake on, or perhaps even the total demise, of the 
collateral order doctrine.134 
In other words, perhaps § 1292(b) can be regarded as preemptive of 
any interpretations of (much less “judge-made” exceptions to) § 1291, 
 130.  Solimine, supra note 126, at 177–78. The exact provenance and scope of the qualified 
immunity defense is currently a hotly contested one in the case law and the academic literature. Id. at 
170.  
131.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
132.  Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 110–12 (2009). 
133.  E.g., P. R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (denial 
of sovereign immunity defense under the Eleventh Amendment satisfied the collateral order doctrine). 
The majority opinion in Mitchell makes no mention of § 1292(b), even though a certification was 
denied in the district court, and its relevance was briefed in the Supreme Court. Solimine, supra note 
126, at 181 n.94. The dissent did mention the possibility of its use in qualified immunity cases. 
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 554 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 134.  The Court suggested as much, albeit without extended discussion, in a case finding the 
doctrine not applicable to immediately review an order denying a stay of proceedings due to parallel 
litigation in another court: Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 288 n.21 
(1988) (citing with approval a case that made that argument, Olson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & 
Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.)). 
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prior to 1958, that resulted in exceptions to the final judgment rule. One 
problem with this argument is that the text of § 1292(b) has no language 
of preemption. Nor does the legislative history, which, perhaps 
surprisingly, appears to make no reference to the collateral order doctrine. 
Only a year after the passage of § 1292(b), no less an authority than 
Professor Wright concluded that the new statute was only an addition to, 
and did not replace, the collateral order doctrine.135 He reasoned, even at 
this early stage, that the doctrine is best regarded as statutorily based, in 
that it recognizes an order “sufficiently separable from the main action to 
be regarded as final decisions and appealable as of right under” § 1291.136 
Thus, § 1292(b) simply adds another exception. Professor Wright’s 
conclusions are sound, even given that the doctrine appeared to enjoy a 
relatively robust life in the courts of appeals in the decade after Cohen.137 
The other, stronger reason to question the continued viability of the 
collateral order doctrine is Congressional action in the early 1990s. Those 
actions followed upon the convening of, and the resultant report of, the 
Federal Courts Study Committee.138 Concerned with a variety of issues 
including court congestion, delays, and expense in the federal court 
system, the Report also remarked on the complicated and confusing 
regime of interlocutory appeals, and recommended that Congress take 
action to authorize the Supreme Court by rulemaking to authorize such 
appeals.139 Congress took the advice by passing two statutes. The Rules 
Enabling Act was amended in 1990 to give the Court rulemaking power 
to “define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of 
appeal under section 1291.”140 In 1992, § 1292 (already the statutory 
repository of several exceptions to the final judgment rule) was amended 
to permit the Court by rule “to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory 
decision to the courts of appeal that is not otherwise provided for” in 
135.  Wright, supra note 12, at 202–03. 
 136.  Id. at 203. He also referred to other exceptions, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b), as not being 
preempted either, since “it is now too well settled by a substantial body of case law that they are to 
be regarded as final decisions to treat them as interlocutory at this late date.” Id. On the other hand, 
he argued that the new statute should limit the use of writs of mandamus, in the sense of being a signal 
to the appellate court not to grant such a writ, if the district judge denies certification. Id. at 203–04. 
See also WRIGHT, supra note 16, § 3911 at 369–70. 
137.  Martineau, supra note 3, at 740. 
138.  For a useful overview of the convening of the Committee, its report, and its implementation 
by Congress, see Martineau, supra note 3, at 718–26. 
 139.  FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITTEE 95–96 (April 2, 1990) [hereinafter FCSC REPORT]. 
 140.  Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990), 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2018)).  
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§ 1292.141 To date, only one such rule had been promulgated. Rule 23(f)
was added to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1998, and it provides 
that the courts of appeals in their discretion can hear an immediate appeal 
from a class certification decision. 
The confluence of the focal points of this Article—§ 1292(b), the 
collateral order doctrine, and the 1990 and 1992 Acts—was addressed by 
the Supreme Court in 2009 in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter.142 
There the Court, in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, held that a 
district court ruling overruling a defendant’s objection to discovery, based 
on the attorney-client privilege, was not immediately appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine.143 In the part of the opinion discussing the 
“effectively unreviewable” prong of the doctrine, the Court drew on what 
it considered the significance of § 1292(b) and the recent Congressional 
legislation. Regarding the former, the Court argued that a reason for not 
creating another exception under the doctrine was the existence of several 
existing “appellate options,”144 including § 1292(b), writs of mandamus, 
and an appeal by a party held in contempt for defying a discovery order.145 
Briefly commenting on the § 1292(b), it suggested that the criteria “are 
most likely to be satisfied when a privilege ruling involves a new legal 
question or is of special consequence, and district courts should not 
hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal in such cases.”146 The possibility 
of at least “some” discovery rulings involving the attorney-client privilege 
being immediately appealable under § 1292(b), and the other exceptions, 
the Court added, ameliorate hardships to affected parties and suggests that 
the “institutional costs” of making all such orders immediately appeal are 
not justified.147 
The Court also referenced the 1990 and 1992 statutes. Its frequent 
statements in collateral order doctrine cases that the doctrine should be 
construed narrowly “has acquired special force in recent years,” the Court 
stated, “with the enactment of legislation designating rulemaking, ‘not 
expansion by court decision,’ as the preferred means for determining 
whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately 
appealable.”148 The Court concluded that “[w]e expect that the 
 141.  Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat. 45006 
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2018)). 
142.  Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100 (2009). 
143.  Id. at 103. 
144.  Id. at 110. 
145.  Id. at 110–13. 
146.  Id. at 111. 
147.  Id. at 112. 
148.  Id. at 113 (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 (1995)). 
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combination of standard post judgment appeals [and] § 1292(b) . . . will 
continue to provide adequate protection to litigants ordered to disclose 
materials . . . . Any further avenue for immediate appeal of such rulings 
should be furnished, it at all, through rulemaking, with the opportunity for 
full airing it provides.”149 
Justice Clarence Thomas reiterated some of these points in his 
concurring opinion. He was highly critical of the Cohen line of cases, 
observing that the Court has long narrowed the scope of the doctrine, 
“principally by raising the bar on what types of interests are ‘important 
enough’ to justify collateral order appeals.”150 But, he added, these 
“attempts to contain the Cohen doctrine have not all been successful or 
persuasive.”151 A better approach, he argued, to the “case-by-case 
adjudication” required by the doctrine is to leave the “value judgments” 
about the “likely’ costs and benefits of allowing an exception to the final 
judgment rule in an entire ‘class of cases’” to the rulemaking process.152 
“And in so doing,” he would “take this opportunity to limit . . . the 
doctrine that, with a sweep of the Court’s pen, subordinated what the 
appellate jurisdiction statute says to what the Court thinks is a good 
idea.”153 
C. The Collateral Order Doctrine, Circa 2020 
To what extent can the existence of § 1292(b), and other exceptions, 
bolstered by the 1990 and 1992 statutes, can be said to spell the demise of 
the collateral order doctrine? Earlier collateral order doctrine cases, in 
holding that the doctrine was not satisfied, had mentioned the apparent 
influence of the recent legislation,154 but it first received extended 
discussion in Mohawk.155 Nonetheless, much like § 1292(b) has not been 
(and should not be) interpreted as spelling the end of the doctrine, the two 
recent statutes should not be interpreted as, by themselves, overruling that 
line of cases. Neither the Court nor Justice Thomas in Mohawk explicitly 
149.  Id. at 114. 
150.  Id. at 117 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
151.  Id. He agreed with the Court’s comments about alternative avenues of appeal, but 
wondered, “why such avenues were not also adequate to address the orders whose unusual importance 
or particularly injurious nature we have held justified immediate appeal under Cohen.” Id. at 118 
(emphasis in original).  
152.  Id. at 118. 
153.  Id. at 119. 
154.  Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 210 (1999) (Thomas, J.); Swint v. 
Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 (1995). 
 155.  For post-Mohawk endorsement of rulemaking in light of the 1990 and 1992 legislation, see 
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1714 (2017). 
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so stated. At most, those opinions can be read as suggesting that the Court 
should no longer hold, under the Cohen criteria, that there can be further 
exceptions to the final judgment rule. Or, to put it less strongly, that such 
holdings are not forbidden but that there should be an even stronger 
presumption than there already is against such holdings.156 
These more modest readings are consistent with the legislative 
history of the laws. Granted, the Federal Courts Study Committee Report 
appears to make only the briefest mention of the collateral order 
doctrine,157 and apart from that the legislative history of the Congressional 
legislation is rather thin.158 That said, the legislative history is best read as 
permitting the Court, via the rulemaking process, to expand the number 
of exceptions to the final judgement rule.159 This reading is also consistent 
with the promulgation of Rule 23(f), which is widely recognized as 
responding to and to a degree limiting the effect of Coopers & Lybrand, 
since the rule permits discretionary appeal of class action certification 
decisions where the decision permitted none.160 Were the Court, under the 
purported authority of the 1990 and 1992 Acts, to simply overrule Cohen 
and its progeny creating exceptions, it would not be expanding them.161 
Even if the Court disclaims a new mandate to explicitly overrule the 
collateral order doctrine, for decades it has openly and unapologetically 
applied the doctrine in narrow manner. In light of Mohawk and other 
cases, that tendency does not appear to be in danger of ending.162 
 156.  Yet another way to manage the doctrine would be to leave intact the decisions finding the 
doctrine satisfied prior to the passage of the 1990 and 1992 Acts, while explicitly or implicitly not 
finding any more exceptions after the passage of those two laws. In effect that is what the Court seems 
to be doing. A variation on that point (suggested to me by Bryan Lammon) would be to not overrule 
or limit decisions until and if there has been rulemaking on point. It is also worth reiterating that 
§ 1292(b) by its terms only applies to civil cases, so it should have less gravitational effect on the use 
of the collateral order doctrine in criminal cases. 
157.  FCSC REPORT, supra note 139, at 95. 
158.  Martineau, supra note 3, at 726.  
159.  FCSC REPORT, supra note 139, at 96; Martineau, supra note 3, at 772; Michael E. Harriss, 
Note, Rebutting the Roberts Court: Reinventing the Collateral Order Doctrine Through Judicial-
Decision Making, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 721, 735–37 (2014). 
 160.  Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (2017); Solimine & Hines, supra note 
117, at 1568. 
 161.  Even under this reading, though, there could be disputes whether a particular rule 
“expands” or “contracts” an existing exception. Thus, I have suggested that Mitchell v. Forsyth could 
be replaced by rulemaking that, among other things, vests discretion in the court of appeals to hear 
immediate appeals of denials of the qualified immunity defense. Solimine, supra note 126, at 183. 
Mitchell, as currently applied, automatically permits all such appeals, at least those that don’t raise 
disputed issues of fact. Id. at 174. This would arguably “contract” the Mitchell exception in a literal 
sense, but leave it intact in a more nuanced way. 
 162.  Recently the Court had two opportunities to revisit the collateral order doctrine, and 
possibly revisit some of the issues posed in the text. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist. v. 
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Continued application by the Court, and by the lower courts, of § 1292(b) 
where appropriate will likely only reinforce that trend. 
Two other factors are likely to continue the withering of the collateral 
order doctrine. The Court has frequently cited the possibility of § 1292(b) 
appeals when holding the doctrine does not apply to a particular order. 
The point can be extended to those decisions holding that a particular 
order does fall under the collateral order doctrine. For example, at least 
some appeals of denials of the qualified immunity defense could and 
should be certified under § 1292(b).163 The qualified immunity defense 
also is an example of how the doctrine might be further narrowed without 
complete overruling. I have earlier suggested that the Court could 
plausibly limit collateral order appeals to those involving high-ranking 
federal officers, which was the case in Mitchell v. Forsyth itself.164 The 
vast majority of such appeals, involving lower level state officials, could 
be replaced by the potential availability of the § 1292(b) and writ of 
mandamus safety valves. 
A second factor portending continued desuetude for the doctrine is 
the venerable concern with federal court caseloads. It is interesting to 
observe that in the year after Cohen was decided, circuit judges were 
deciding on average about 73 appeals each year, but that number had risen 
to 329 by 2014.165 This steep increase occurred despite the increase in the 
Tesla Energy Operations, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 1323 (2018), involved whether the doctrine covered a denial 
of the state-action defense in an antitrust suit. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on 
the issue, but certiorari was then dismissed after the parties settled the case. Id. In Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Texas Catholic Conference of Bishops, 139 S. Ct. 1170 (2019), the Court was asked to 
consider a Fifth Circuit decision, Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, 896 F.3d 362 (5th Cir. 2018), 
which 2-1 held that the doctrine was satisfied when a third-party subject of discovery raised objections 
under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, which had been denied by the district court. The 
Supreme Court, without recorded dissent, denied certiorari and thus passed on an opportunity to 
further restrict the doctrine. Whole Women’s Health, 139 S. Ct. at 1170. The refusal to grant the appeal 
was arguably surprising, since the lower court decision, while purporting to distinguish Mohawk, like 
that case concerned discovery orders and potentially created a robust source of interlocutory appeals. 
I was a signatory in both cases to amicus curiae briefs of law professors which argued that an 
exception under the collateral order doctrine should not be found. See Brief of Federal Courts Scholars 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Salt River, 138 S. Ct. at 1323 (2018) (No. 17-368); Brief 
of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health, 139 S. Ct. at 
1170 (2019) (No. 18-622) [hereinafter Whole Woman’s Health Amicus Brief]. My comments in this 
footnote and in the rest of this Article are my own and do not necessarily reflect any views of other 
signatories to these briefs. 
 163.  Solimine, supra note 126, at 180–81. Indeed, Mitchell v. Forsyth should have been a good 
candidate for use of § 1292(b), given the uncertainties at the time of the personal liabilities of the U.S. 
Attorney General. Id. at 181 n.94.  
164.  Id. at 177. 
 165.  Whole Woman’s Health Amicus Brief, supra note 162, at 20 (citing Marin K. Levy, 
Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2388 (2014) (book review)). For further discussion 
of the long-term concerns with and responses to increasing caseloads in the federal appellate courts, 
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number of appellate judges for each circuit. Surely it has had, and will 
continue to have, an implicit impact on appeals to the Supreme Court 
which call on it to increase the work of the circuit courts, and indirectly 
its own. 
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has both a descriptive and normative component. On the 
former, it has addressed with data the use of § 1292(b) appeals at both the 
district and appellate circuit levels; how § 1292(b) jurisprudentially 
interacts with, and how it has led (along with other factors) to the 
narrowing, of the collateral order doctrine. On the latter, it has argued that 
§ 1292(b) should be broadly interpreted, and that, on the whole, it has
been interpreted in a broader fashion by both high-profile, and more 
conventional, recent decisions. Conversely, the collateral order doctrine 
is subject to several infirmities, not least of which is that it is a “blunt 
instrument,” subjecting entire categories of trial court orders to automatic 
interlocutory appeals. Instead, the more nuanced appeals under § 1292(b), 
or perhaps under new rule-making by the Supreme Court, are more 
appropriate vehicles for allowing interlocutory appeals, since unlike the 
collateral order doctrine, they permit more surgical precision in weighing 
the pros (avoiding hardship) and cons (disrupting the ordinary litigation 
process at the trial level) of interlocutory appeals in individual cases. In 
this way, I suggest, the federal courts can avoid the venerable “Serbonian 
bogs”166 or the “crazy quilt”167 that has long characterized by many 
observers the present regime of interlocutory appeals in the federal courts. 
see WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS (2013). See generally Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and 
Confronting the Federal Judiciary Capacity “Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform, 
108 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author). 
166.  See Anderson, supra note 111. 
 167.  See Nagle, supra note 93. See also Steinman, supra note 26, at 1238–39 (canvassing 
pejorative descriptions for interlocutory appeal doctrine). 
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APPENDIX 
Section 1292(b) Appeals Decided on the Merits, by Circuit, 2015–2019 
CIRCUIT 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
DC 1 1 1 2 2 
1 1 3 1 2 4 
2 5 6 8 27 10 
3 14 12 7 10 8 
4 8 9 7 7 5 
5 12 10 4 14 5 
6 9 13 6 11 11 
7 11 3 13 5 9 
8 4 5 7 0 3 
9 22 18 22 14 12 
10 6 6 1 7 4 
11 12 5 7 7 7 
TOTAL 105 91 84 106 80 
Source: Administrative Office of the United States Courts, see supra notes 
29–30. 
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